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Abstract
Sensor network is a notion denoting an interesting subset of self-organising wireless networks.
These networks are rather dense as each node have typically more than dozen neighbours, and
large – with tens to hundreds thousands of nodes. Applications of such networks assume distributed
environmental sensing performed by each sensor in the network, where data from a particular sensor
gain value only when combined with data from a relatively high number of other sensors. One of
the open security questions in this speciﬁc environment is a possibility to lower requirements on
key distribution and key management and thus decrease production costs. One of the possible ways
is “key infection”. The paper recaps a protocol and already published results. It also elaborates
the concept of key infection by introducing a new variant of security ampliﬁcation protocol, and
presents some interesting results obtained by simulations.
Keywords: Sensor network, key management, key infection, key predistribution, smart dust,
ampliﬁcation, protocol.
1 Introduction
Wireless networks are widely used today and they will spread even more with
increasing number of personal digital devices people are going to use in near
future. Sensor networks form just a small fraction of future applications but
they abstract some of the new concepts in distributed computing. Still, the no-
tion of sensor network is used in several diﬀerent contexts. There are projects
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targeting development of very small and cheap sensors (e.g. [11]) as well as
research in middleware architectures [14] and routing protocols (AODV [4],
DSR [5], TORA, . . . ) for self-organising networks – to name a few.
In this paper, we are interested in very simple sensors but we are assuming
large number of them in a network. The number is such that it is infeasible
to deploy sensors manually. Deployment in batches implies self-organising
network that is automatically and autonomously established upon physical
deployment of sensors. Large numbers of sensors make it also hard to change
code or data stored in particular sensors – it is much easier to mass-produce
sensors that are identical even on ﬁrmware and data level.
We focus here on key management schemes for sensor networks. Section 2
overviews some of the existing models that are based on key predistribution
ensuring that either most sensors will able to talk to each other, or there will
always be some of the neighbour nodes sharing a pairwise key. Key infection
introduced in section 3, on the other hand, does not presume existence of
predistributed keys and all sensors can be thus identical, cheap to produce,
and resistant to data-discovery attacks in pre-deployment production phases.
Section 4 introduces some interesting results we found while playing with
sensor networks behaviour.
2 Key predistribution schemes
Deployment of a sensor network can be split into several phases. The following
list is adjusted to discern important processes of key infection protocols. The
main phases are as follows:
(i) physical nodes deployment – random spreading of sensors over a target
area in one throw or in several smaller batches,
(ii) neighbours discovery – sensors are trying to ﬁnd their neighbours and
establish communication channels,
(iii) initial key setup – initial pairwise keys are established,
(iv) key ampliﬁcation – sensors are improving secrecy of shared keys by using
intermediary nodes,
(v) establishment of point-to-point keys – the ﬁnal goal is always to transmit
data securely from sensors to one of a few sinks. Point-to-point keys are
pairwise keys between sensors and sinks (or distant sensors),
(vi) message exchange – the production phase of the network.
We are most interested in phases three and four, while the ﬁrst two are
based on random distribution and the last one is beyond our scope as long as
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it does not contain further key ampliﬁcations (that can be repeatedly applied
on the network). Phase ﬁve may be subject of a following research.
2.1 Random key pre-distribution
Most known key predistribution schemes expect that any two nodes can estab-
lish a shared pairwise (link) key when they happen to be physical neighbours
within their transmission range. This requirement can be weakened in such
a way, that two physical neighbours can establish a link key only with a cer-
tain probability which is still suﬃcient to keep the whole network connected
through secure links. Such models introduce a trade-oﬀ between the graph
connectivity of link keys and the memory required to store keys on nodes. If
the network disconnects, it is usually possible to increase radio transmission
power to reach nodes bridging separated parts of the network.
Idea of random key pre-distribution for WSN was for the ﬁrst time intro-
duced in [8] as EG scheme. There is an initialisation phase when a pool S of
random keys is generated. m keys is randomly chosen from the pool S (with-
out replacement) for each node. Size of the pool |S| and size of each node
key-ring |m| is chosen in such a way that any two nodes share at least one
key with a predeﬁned probability p. After the deployment, neighbour nodes
perform key setup phase, trying to ﬁnd shared subset of keys and use them
for initial link encryption.
Chan, Parrig, and Song extend, in [3], EG schema by q-composite random
key predistribution, requiring at least q shared keys instead of one (referred
as q-EG) for a secure link connection. The number of required shared keys
makes it exponentially harder for the attacker to compromise a link key with
a given subset of already compromised keys, but it also lowers probability
of establishing a link key. If the node key ring size |m| is ﬁxed, the total
size of key pool |S| must be reduced to preserve the same key establishment
probability. The attacker is also able to obtain larger fraction of S from a
node. A formula for optimum tradeoﬀ is also deﬁned.
EG schema is further extended in [13] by using pseudo-random generation
of key indexes (seed-based key deployment) rather than completely random
one. The advantage is that two neighbors can compute their shared keys only
from node IDs without additional communication. The paper also describes
co-operative version of seed-based key deployment protocol exploiting sets
of common neighbours of two nodes A and B for secrecy ampliﬁcation. A
chooses randomly a set of B-neighbours (mediators Ci) and asks them to
compute HMAC(IDA, KCiB). Results from all mediators are xor-ed together
with original key value KAB and used as the new key value. Node B can
compute this new key value without further communication from a list of
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mediators used.
2.2 Pairwise key pre-distribution
Pairwise key pre-distribution scheme is a scheme, where given key is shared
by exactly two nodes. In a basic pairwise scheme, each node shares a unique
key with every other node in network ( (n-1) pairwise scheme). This scheme is
perfectly resilient against node capture 3 , but is poorly scalable and has high
memory storage requirements.
A modiﬁcation of basic pairwise scheme (CPS scheme) is proposed in [3]. A
probability p of two neighbours to share a key is deﬁned ﬁrst. Unique pairwise
keys for are then generated for subsets |m| of randomly chosen nodes. When
compared to EG scheme, node-to-node authentication can be performed. To-
tal number of nodes in the network is limited to n = m/p.
Key pre-distribution scheme (referred as Blom’s scheme) that allows any
pair of nodes to be able to ﬁnd pairwise secret key is proposed in [2]. Blom’s
scheme requires substantially less memory than (n-1) pairwise key scheme, but
still allows for computing pairwise key between any two nodes. Blom’s scheme
is perfectly resilient until λ nodes are compromised (λ-secure property). If
only one global key space of Blom’s scheme is used, λ must be unwieldy high,
as well as the required memory to resist node capture. Scalability of such
approach is very poor.
Solution based on multiple key spaces is proposed in [6] (DDHV scheme).
Instead of one global key space, large key pool S of key spaces KSi is generated
and m randomly chosen key spaces KSi are assigned to each node alike EG
scheme. Each separate key space then uses the basic Blom’s scheme. This
approach can be viewed as a combination of EG key pool scheme and a single
space approach – like Blom’s one. DDHV scheme gives very good node capture
resilience until a threshold value of total number of compromised nodes are
reached (yet it is based on EG and CPS schemes).
Hwang and Kim [10] revisit basic random pre-distribution EG scheme, CPS
scheme, and DDHV using giant graph component theory by Erdo¨s and Re´ney
to demonstrate that even when node degree is small, most of the network
remains connected. If the network connectivity requirements are just for a
substantial graph component (e.g. 98% of nodes), we can get substantial
improvements of local connectivity or lower memory requirements on nodes.
Previous schemes presume that probability of any two nodes to become
physical neighbours is uniform. However, in many practical scenarios, some
probabilistic knowledge about node deployment can be available a priori. De-
3 No other keys are compromised besides the ones stored in the captured node.
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tails about schemes exploiting knowledge about “deployment” can be found
in [12], [7], [9].
As you can see, there is a large number of schemes for sensor networks. The
rest of the paper should give an arguments (against predistribution schemes)
in favour of dynamic key-establishment protocols.
3 Key infection
Key infection was introduced by Anderson, Chan, and Perrig in [1]. The most
important issue introduced in the paper is a real world attacker model – as
this justify our approach we give it a bit more space. The predistribution
schemes introduced in previous section assume a global passive adversary able
to monitor all the communication in the network. This was, with some of the
schemes, combined with a local active adversary able to dissassemble single
nodes and extract stored predistributed keys or deploy its own sensors that
become active in the network’s routing protocol.
Our attacker model foresees applications where it is not necessary to pro-
tect conﬁdentiality of all data but majority of data. An example might be a
sensor network monitoring a certain area for environmental conditions – tem-
perature, humidity, seismic activity, . . . . If an attacker acquires small part of
the data, he is able to create a map that is very sparse and we do not mind
when this happens. The real value is in the dense and detailed map we can
create by combining data from all the sensors. Another example of networks
where our attacker model is justiﬁable compose networks tracking dynamic
data. Thus information obtained from a small subset of sensors gives the at-
tacker only static data (like how many cars go through certain roads but) but
she is not able to ﬁnd out dynamic data (e.g. what are the routes of cars).
Let us denote such networks as commodity networks.
3.1 Attacker model
As pointed out in [1], the model with a global passive adversary is the one
usually used in crypto research. However, there are two aspects against prac-
ticality of this model, especially when sensitive data (pairwise keys) are ex-
change during an instant. We deduce that the attacker must be able to deploy
a number of sensors comparable with the size of the original network to eaves-
drop all the communication. And this must happen at the very moment when
the original network is being deployed. The attacker cannot use substantially
lower number of listening devices due to RF signal transmission properties.
Firstly, wireless networks will have usually only limited number of frequency
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channels that are repeatedly used by the nodes in the network. If there was
just one adversary eavesdropping the network, most of the communication
would be unreadable because of noise generated by other transmissions on the
same frequency. Also, if the networks are to use frequencies above, let us say
25 GHz, the nodes can have optimal antennas. The attacker therefore cannot
use devices with much better signal gain and improvements can be obtained
only through directional antennas.
Secondly, when we assume sensor networks comprised of hundred thousand
nodes, we can easily assume that information from single nodes does not make
any sense until combined with data from other sensors. It means that single
node data are not sensitive and we can lower security requirements and say
that we just have to secure most of the data produced by nodes.
There is another important facet of the problem. If a sensor network con-
sisted of, let us say, 100,000 nodes that have to be easy to produce, there is
very high probability that some of the sensors would be broken, or worse, mal-
functioning and allowing attacker to cryptanalyse some of the predistributed
keys and listen to a certain portion of the traﬃc in the network. The question
that stands out is whether we can weaken the attacker model to the following
informal deﬁnition.
The hostile surveillance is not ubiquitous during the deploy-
ment phase of the network and only fraction of the established
link keys can be obtained by the attacker.
The new attacker model we are using further on is thus based on the
following assumptions:
(i) the attacker is without access to the deployment site during the network
deployment;
(ii) the attacker is able to monitor only a fraction of communication during
the deployment;
(iii) there is no active attack during the deployment phase.
As we want to get production costs of sensors as low as possible, it would
be quite signiﬁcant to get rid of key predistribution. In other words we want
to design a key establishment protocol without global knowledge – predis-
tributed keys – that would still fulﬁl security requirements for commodity
sensor networks.
The simplest possible way of exchanging keys is to broadcast them in
clear to all neighbours. As the network nodes start organising themselves and
establishing routing paths, the key material is propagated by neighbours – thus
the notion “key infection”. The plaintext key exchange is not much useful in
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common scenarios but when this process starts in hundred thousands instances
at a time, it becomes extremely diﬃcult for an attacker to compromise larger
fraction of the network due to reasons described above.
3.2 Ampliﬁcation Protocols
The concepts introduced in [1] include whispering and multi-path key estab-
lishment. Whispering is used to describe a procedure when transmission range
of a node is being increased by small steps until a neighbour node can hear
the data transmitted.
In the multi-path key establishment, node A generates q diﬀerent random
values and sends each of them along a diﬀerent path to node B. The attacker
must eavesdrop all the paths to compromise the new key value. Multi-hop key
ampliﬁcation is basically 2-path version of multi-path key establishment.
The original ampliﬁcation protocol proposed in [1] is using one intermedi-
ate node (W3), neighbour of two nodes W2 and W1 that is asked to retransmit
a new random number updating existing link key k12 of the nodes W1 and W2.
The notation of the following lines reproducing the original protocol consists
of N1 and N2 – random numbers generated by nodes W1 and W2 respectively,
pairwise keys kij, k
′
ij of nodes Wi and Wj, and a hash function H(.).
W1 → W3 : {W1,W2, N1}k13
W3 → W2 : {W1,W2, N1}k23
k′
12
= H(k12||N1)
W2 → W1 : {N1, N2}k′
12
W1 → W2 : {N2}k′
12
When we read this protocol (let us call it push protocol) we thought it
would be interesting to see what would happen if we reversed the protocol
(made it pull protocol) and W3 would be the node initiating the ampliﬁcation.
(In fact, this was the initial stimulus for all the work we present here.)
W3 → W1 : {W1,W2, N1}k13
W3 → W2 : {W1,W2, N1}k23
k′
12
= H(k12||N1)
W2 → W1 : {N1, N2}k′
12
W1 → W2 : {N2}k′
12
The basic idea is that the area where black nodes must be positioned to
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successfully compromise a link key is smaller than in the push protocol and
we wanted to make it clear also by simulations.
The second reason for us to start analysing the ampliﬁcation was to get a
bit more detailed results than those presented in [1] – so we implemented a
simulator allowing us to work with networks of hundred thousands of nodes.
3.3 Comparing numbers of used messages
Number of messages for the push and pull protocols as described above is
all the same. The probability of a new key k′
12
to be established using the
mediator W3 is the same for both schemes – the mediator must be in the
transmission range of W1 as well as W2. So far, no diﬀerence between the
push and the pull scheme in respect to communication eﬃciency.
But we can improve the pull scheme used in combination with basic whis-
pering (key is generated by only one node of the pair) – a variant giving very
competitive results with ampliﬁcation while keeping number of messages low.
Let us assume that black nodes are deployed prior to white nodes, and before
the initial key setup (see Section 2) in the white network (this is indeed our
case). In this setup, we can eliminate encryption of messages, and thus remove
one of the messages, sent by W3. W3 can simply transmit value N1 in plaintext
using minimum energy allowing the signal to reach W1, as well as W2. That
is because N1 is transmitted with exactly the same signal strength as k13 or
k23 during the initial key exchange (basic whispering). If the attacker is (and
was) able to eavesdrop communication between W3 and W1 or W2 (whichever
is further from W3), the new key will be compromised anyway as the attacker
already possesses the link key k13 or k23, respectively.
4 Simulation
Currently, the simulation tool we are using allows simple changes in numbers
of white and black nodes, transmission ranges of the nodes as well as the size of
the deployment area. Black nodes represent an attacker locally eavesdropping
communication in the white network [15]. Let us move to the experiments’
setup.
4.1 Setup
White and black nodes are randomly distributed over a pre-deﬁned area.
Neighbours discovery phase is performed for each white node based on its
transmission range. Black nodes are not taking part in routing or key estab-
lishment procedures. Black nodes act just as passive communication eaves-
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droppers – they represent a passive adversary. Transmission and reception
ranges are equal and there is no diﬀerence between whites and blacks in this
sense. Black nodes, however, share immediately all information eavesdropped
by any of them.
We assume two transmission modes in the experiments. The ﬁrst one is
deﬁned as a transmission with maximum power – covering all neighbours of a
given white node. The second one is based on gradual increase of transmission
power – called whispering. It means that the number of neighbours able to
here the transmitting node is being increased by one each time the power is
boosted.
4.2 Results
This section describes several interesting issues we have found in simulation
results. Our ﬁrst goal (the goal initially motivating our work) was to verify
results presented in [1]. Unfortunately, our results had the same dynamics but
absolute numbers were diﬀerent and in a quite substantially – 50-100%.
We asked authors for their original source ﬁles and as they very kindly
and quickly sent the ﬁles in question to us we could go through the code.
We found that their implementation is correct but only very small mesh to
position nodes was used and the number of nodes used was also considerably
low. When we slightly increased implicit number of nodes, the results varied in
tens percents. After identifying the source of deviations, we focused entirely
on our tool and started more detailed analysis of results with networks of
10.000 - 100.000 nodes.
The ﬁrst set of graphs (ﬁg. 1) shows results from a network of 10.000 nodes
with 1% of black nodes (i.e., there is 100 black nodes).
The set contains graphs for four diﬀerent methods. In brief, we are combin-
ing basic and mutual whispering with pull and push ampliﬁcation protocols.
When the initial key is generated by just one node of a pair, we call it ba-
sic whispering. Mutual whispering is the situation when the initial key is
combined from two random numbers sent by both nodes in a pair to each
other.
The simulations are performed with increasing density of networks and
the resulting graphs depict averaged results from at least ﬁve simulation runs.
The setup used here represents situations when the adversary is able to spread
certain number of sensors into the deployment area. They can combine their
knowledge, i.e. their transmission range is much longer than the one of white
nodes.
You can ﬁnd at least three very interesting phenomena in the graphs.
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Fig. 1. Fractions of compromised link keys with 1% of black nodes.
Mutual whispering is better than basic whispering by a constant that is
given by area ratio of a circle and of an intersection of two circles distant
by their radius – this ration is about 0.4. However, the impact of selected
whispering type on the ampliﬁcation protocols results is much more signiﬁ-
cant. It can be best seen on the upper graphs where the peak of the number
of compromised keys diﬀers four-folds and the overall course of the curves
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
The worst ampliﬁcation results are for a relatively low density networks.
When the network density is reduced to 2–4 neighbours (this can happen by
natural reasons like node failures or malicious attacker behaviour), we can
squeeze percentage of compromised keys and increase security of the network
by adding new white nodes into the network. This key security improvement
is very radical and we are able to get the percentage of compromised keys
very close to nought for networks with average number of neighbours over
twenty. According to numerical results, we are able to get from 0.68% down
to 0.00% when increasing density of the network above 20 neighbours in
the case of pull ampliﬁcation with basic whispering. It is less than ﬁve
compromised keys in the network of 10.000 nodes.
One cannot improve ratio of secure keys with density when a certain
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number of black nodes is deployed. This is apparent from the ﬁrst graph
when this threshold is reached. In this case, we can very slightly decrease
the fraction of compromised keys by increasing density of the network but
the best result we can reach is still above 1.5% in this particular graph. We
can easily ﬁnd conﬁgurations when it is useless to deploy new white nodes
to improve security properties. Each ampliﬁcation method has got diﬀerent
equilibrium point (percentage of black nodes) when no improvement can be
reached. In fact, when this equilibrium point is surpassed, the results are
getting monotonically worse with the density of the network.
Pull protocol works nicely with basic whispering but the results are identical
with the push protocol when applied after mutual whispering. You can
see that the pull protocol works much better over basic whispering. The
threshold is 0.76%, compared to 1.99%. Also, the threshold point is at much
lower network density. The peak is reached for the density of about 2 while
mutual whispering has got the peak for the average network density of 5 or
more. If the power consumption is by far the most important aspect, the
combination of pull protocols with basic whispering is the best choice as
each new key or its refreshing represents just one message.
The ampliﬁcation results are naturally getting worse with increasing num-
ber of black nodes in the network. The second set of graphs on ﬁg. 2 shows
an extreme situation, with respect to our attacker model, when the number
of black nodes equals 20% of white nodes deployed.
These graphs are not so optimistic for the network as the previous ones in
absolute numbers. On the other hand, we can put it in the way that when each
white node has, in average, two black nodes in its transmission range, there
is still 90% of keys secure. Let us again analyse a bit the depicted results.
There is an interval of network densities where the number of secure keys
is decreasing with density. It is rather interesting that it is only a short in-
terval and when the network density goes above a certain level, the link
keys’ security starts decreasing with density. It can be best seen in the
graph of pull protocol with basic whispering. We are not sure about the
reasons yet, but it is a property that can be used to determine optimum
density of the network from the security point of view and reduce cost of
node redeployment by limiting number of newly deployed white keys to
reach best possible security.
First three runs of ampliﬁcation protocols bring substantial improvements.
The graphs show ﬁve runs of ampliﬁcation protocols and the last two pro-
duce very little improvements. This is again an interesting result potentially
limiting number of messages necessary to obtain maximum security of the
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Fig. 2. Fractions of compromised link keys with 20% of black nodes.
pairwise keys. It means that 3.n transmissions of random numbers for am-
pliﬁcation (where n is the network density) by each node is all needed.
We believe that these results are still very good for the whispering and
ampliﬁcation protocols. About 7% of compromised keys in a network where
2-3 black nodes are in reach of any white node (lower right graph for density
15) is still a very surprising result. Especially when we start reason back in
terms of our attacker model when only fraction of the deployment area can be
eavesdropped by the adversary.
We selected the last set of graphs as it announces another interesting fact
we have found – uneven distribution of compromised nodes. The graphs show
numbers of black nodes that were able to compromise a certain number of link
keys. The results were obtained from networks of 100.000 white nodes with
1% of black nodes. There are six protocols we have been studying and the
graphs depict success rates of black nodes.
The ﬁrst graph covers situation when keys are sent in clear with maximum
transmission power. You can see that success rate is according to Poisson
distribution. However, the number of compromised link keys is spread rather
evenly. Basic whispering shifts the mean value very strongly towards low
number of compromised link keys per black node.
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Fig. 3. Distribution of black nodes success rates.
However, the mutual whispering is a real killer and the peak is positioned
in nought. It means that number of black nodes not able to compromise a
single key is relatively high. Also the number of really successful black nodes,
nodes able to compromise large number of keys, is rapidly decreasing with the
success rate. When we take a look at the last graph – ampliﬁcation protocol
(push and pull have the same results) combined with mutual whispering, the
number of black nodes not able to eavesdrop a single key is about 300 out of
1000 black nodes.
The implication for security of “white” link keys is that eﬀective number
of black nodes is much lower than the number of black nodes deployed. The
uneven distribution also indicates that there might be large areas in the white
network without compromised link keys.
5 Some answers
The initial goal of the work was to verify experimental results by Anderson,
Chan, and Perrig and this was done. We believe that our results correspond
to earlier results and conﬁrm very good resistance of ampliﬁcation protocols
against local adversary. The setups we were using assumed that all black nodes
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deployed in the network are able to communicate and share their knowledge.
It means that the nodes would have to use much more power for mutual
communication than the white nodes in the network.
Our results are also much wider. We have found some surprising thresholds
in the network density, number of black nodes, and number of ampliﬁcation
runs that can be used to adjust security properties of the network by changing
or setting density of the network and still limit amount of communication. We
believe that this alone is a very interesting result. We have also found a setting
not identiﬁed before that is very eﬃcient (from the communication point of
view) and still ensuring very good security of link keys.
In the beginning, we just wanted to verify some of the results already
presented. However, the results started to be more and more interesting as
we dived deeper into the properties of the protocols. Our view is that the
presented results are just preliminary and there are many more interesting
issues to be discovered. Currently, we are formalising our experimental results
into mathematical equations to allow easy use of the results for “security
tuning” of sensor networks.
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